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AN APPLICATION OF INDEX FORMS IN
CRYPTOGRAPHY
ATTILA BE´RCZES AND ISTVA´N JA´RA´SI
Abstract. In the present paper we investigate the possibility of using
index forms as basic ingredients of cryptographically important func-
tions. We suggest the use of a hash function based on index forms and
we prove some important properties of the suggested function.
1. Introduction
In [1] and [2] Be´rczes, Ko¨dmo¨n and Petho˝ investigated the possibility of
cryptographical applications of norm forms. They provided a detailed com-
plexity analysis of the computation of values of norm forms, and suggested
the use of a hash function based on norm forms. They even proved that in
a probabilistic sense their hash function is collision resistant. Further, the
company Crypto Ltd. purchased the idea of this hash function from the
University of Debrecen and implemented the hash function. They named
the product CODEFISH. The aim of the present paper is to investigate the
possibility of building a hash function based on index forms.
2. Basic definitions
2.1. Definition of some cryptographic primitives. The Handbook of
Applied Cryptography [14] defines the one way function in the following
way:
Definition 2.1. A function f from a set X to a set Y is called a one-way
function if f(x) is easy to compute for all x ∈ X but for essentially all
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elements y ∈ Im(f) it is computationally infeasible to find any x ∈ X such
that f(x) = y.
Remark 2.1. The phrase ”for essentially all elements in Y ” refers to the
fact that there are a few values y ∈ Y for which it is easy to find an x ∈ X
such that y = f(x). For example, one may compute y = f(x) for a small
number of x values and then for these, the inverse is known by table look-
up. An alternate way to describe this property of a one-way function is the
following: for a random y ∈ Im(f) it is computationally infeasible to find
any x ∈ X such that f(x) = y.
The above definition is very simple, and shows most clearly the simple
ideas behind the concept of one-way function. However, we are looking for
cryptographically interesting functions, with some mathematically proved
properties, so we shall need rigorous definition of the terms ”easy” and
”computationally infeasible”. Thus in this paper we will use the modern
notion of one-way functions based on complexity theory which involves prob-
abilistic algorithms instead of deterministic ones. This setting was proposed
first by Goldwasser and Micali [11]. The definition of a one-way function
and a collection of one-way functions below are from the book of Goldwasser
and Bellare [10].
Definition 2.2. The function ν : N → R is called negligible, if for every
constant c ≥ 0 there exists an integer kc such that ν(k) < k−c for all k ≥ kc.
Definition 2.3. The function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is called a one-way
function if:
(1) There exists a PPT algorithm1 that on input x outputs f(x).
(2) For every PPT algorithm A there is a negligible function νA such that
for sufficiently large k,
P
[
f(z) = y : x
R∈ {0, 1}k ; y = f(x); z = A(k, y)
]
≤ νA(k),
where the probability is taken over choices of x, and the coin tosses of A.
1Probabilistic polynomial time
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The guarantee is probabilistic. The adversary is not unable to invert
the function, but has a low probability of doing so where the probability
distribution is taken over the input x to the one-way function where x is
of length k, and the possible coin tosses of the adversary. Namely, x
R∈
{0, 1}k denotes that x is chosen randomly with uniform distribution from
all possible binary words with length k, and y is set to f(x). So the meaning
of Definition 2.3 is that the probability of the following event is negligible:
One chooses x randomly with binary length k and computes y = f(x).
The algorithm A computes from input k and y the output z such that
f(z) = y.
This definition is less directly relevant to practice, but useful for theoret-
ical purposes.
Important properties of one-way functions are the collision resistance and
the avalanche effect. Now we are presenting the definition of these notions.
Definition 2.4. A one-way function f is collision resistant if there exists
a negligible function ν, such that
P [f(x1) = f(x2)] ≤ ν(k)
holds for any two distinct inputs x1 6= x2 and sufficiently large k, where the
probability is taken independently over all x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}k.
Remark 2.2. In this definition (x1, x2) is considered as a uniformly dis-
tributed vector variable. There is another property of f to find x2 for fixed
input x1 or to find x2 for fixed output f(x1) such that f(x1) = f(x2). We
call these properties 2nd-preimage resistance and preimage resistance re-
spectively. For their definitions see [14].
Remark 2.3. Obviously the one-to-one functions are collision resistant.
The notion of avalanche effect is discussed first in connection with the
S-boxes of DES by Feistel, Notz and Smith [5]. Kam and Davida [12] called
this property completeness and defined it in the following way: a function is
complete if each output bit depends on all input bits. Webster and Tavares
[17] proposed the more stringent notion of avalanche effect:
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Definition 2.5. (Strict avalanche criterion) We say that a function f has
strict avalanche effect if whenever one input bit of f is changed, every
output bit of f is changing with probability 1
2
.
More simply, a function has strict avalanche effect if the change of one
input bit implies a change on about the half of the output bits.
One-way hash functions play also a fundamental role in modern cryptog-
raphy.
Definition 2.6. The function f is a one-way hash function if f is a
one-way, collision resistant function and f maps an input x of arbitrary
finite bit-length to an output f(x) of fixed bit-length.
The widely used one-way hash functions (MD5, RIPE-MD, SHA) are
based on block ciphers. For results and further references we refer to the
books [14] and [16].
2.2. Index forms. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n ≥ 3 with
discriminant DK and ring of integers OK . Let σ1 = id, σ2, . . . , σn denote
the Q-isomorphisms of K in C. For any α ∈ K, put α(i) = σi(α). Consider
the linear forms l(i)(X) = X1 + α
(i)X2 + · · · + (α(i))n−1Xn for i = 1, . . . , n,
with the convention that l(1)(X) = l(X). Put lij(X) := l
(i)(X) − l(j)(X).
Then
(2.1) DK/Q(l(X)) :=
∏
1≤i<j≤n
l2ij(X)
is a decomposable form with coefficients in Z. Clearly, we have
(2.2) DK/Q(l(X)) = (Iα(X))2DK ,
where Iα(X) = Iα(X2, . . . , Xn) is a decomposable form of degree n(n−1)/2
with coefficients in Z.
Definition 2.7. The above form Iα(X) is called the index form of the basis
{1, α, . . . , αn−1}.
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3. Results
Construction 1. Put m := n − 1. Let s be an integer and define the
mapping Iα,s : Zms → Zs in the following way:
(3.3) Iα,s : (x1, ..., xm) 7→ Iα(x1, . . . , xm) mod s.
where u mod s denotes the remainder by dividing u by s. (Note that Iα(X)
in fact is a form with integer coefficients in n− 1 variables.)
Theorem 3.1. Let α be an algebraic integer of degree n ≥ 5, and sup-
pose that the Galois group of the extension field Q(α) over Q is Sn. Let
p and q be primes such that q > p > q/2 and s := pq. Suppose that
gcd(n(n−1)
2
, ϕ(s)) = 1. Let N(α, b, s) denote the number of solutions of the
congruence Iα(x1, . . . , xm) ≡ b (mod s). Then for large enough values of
p and q we have the following:
• if (b, s) = 1 we have
|N(α, b, s)− sm−1| < c1(α)sm−1− 14 ;
• otherwise
N(α, b, s) < c2(α)s
m−1.
Theorem 3.2. Let α be an algebraic integer of degree n ≥ 5, and suppose
that the Galois group of the extension field Q(α) over Q is Sn. Let p and q be
primes such that q > p > q/2 and s := pq. Suppose that gcd(n(n−1)
2
, ϕ(s)) =
1. Then for large enough values of p and q the probability of collision Pcoll
for the function Iα,s satisfies the inequality
Pcoll <
C
s
,
where the constant C depends only on α.
Remark. We mention that in Theorems 4 and 5 of [2] the assumption that
the primes p and q are sufficiently large is also necessary. This mistake was
observed by A. Petho˝. However, using the below Lemma 4.1 and Lemma
4.3 the proof of the results of [2] is also complete. These two Lemmata were
established jointly with A. Petho˝.
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4. Proofs
Lemma 4.1. Let K be any field. Let f(X) := f(X1, . . . , Xm) :=
n∏
i=1
(βi1X1+
· · · + βimXm) ∈ K[X1, . . . , Xm] be a form with the properties βij ∈ K for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
βij 6= 0. Suppose that there exist
1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ n such that the polynomial
(4.4) f0(Xj1 , Xj2) :=
n∏
i=1
(βij1Xj1 + βij2Xj2)
has a simple zero. Then the polynomial f(X) − a is irreducible for every
0 6= a ∈ K.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. This is in fact a generalization of Lemma 2 in [2],
where the case K = C is treated. However, the proof is in fact the same for
the more general case, too. 
Lemma 4.2. Let α be an algebraic number of degree n ≥ 5 over Q. Denote
the absolute conjugates of α by α(1) = α, α(2), . . . , α(n). Suppose that the
Galois group of the extension field Q(α) over Q is Sn. Then we have
α(1) + α(2) 6∈ {α(u) + α(v) | 1 ≤ u < v ≤ n, (u, v) 6= (1, 2)} .
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let 1 ≤ u < v ≤ n be two integers with (u, v) 6=
(1, 2), and suppose that we have
(4.5) α(1) + α(2) = α(u) + α(v).
First suppose that u = 1. Then we have α(2) = α(v) and v 6= 2 since
(u, v) 6= (1, 2). This contradicts the assumption that α(2) and α(v) are two
distinct absolute conjugates of α. Clearly, the assumption u = 2 leads to a
similar contradiction.
Now suppose that u 6= 1, 2. Then we also have v 6= 1, 2. Now, since
the Galois group G of the extension field Q(α) over Q is Sn and n ≥ 5
there exists an element σ of G such that α(1), α(2) and α(u) are fixed under
the action of σ and α(v) is moved to α(w) with v 6= w. This leads to
α(1) + α(2) = α(u) + α(w), which together with (4.5) shows that α(v) = α(w).
Since v 6= w this is again a contradiction. 
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Lemma 4.3. Let F (X, Y ) ∈ Z[X, Y ] a polynomial which has a simple
zero over C. Then for any sufficiently large prime p ∈ Z the polynomial
f˜(X, Y ) := f(X, Y ) mod p has a simple zero over any fixed algebraic clo-
sure of the finite field Fp.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. If p is large enough, then the procedure for computing
the gcd(f, f ′) is exactly the same over Fp as over Z. Thus Lemma 4.3
follows. 
Proof of theorem 3.1. We consider the equation Iα(X1, ..., Xm) ≡ b (mod s)
and put f := Iα(X1, ..., Xm)− b.
First suppose that gcd(b, s) = 1. It is easily seen that by Lemmata 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3 the polynomial f is absolutely irreducible over Fp, if p ∈ Z is a
sufficiently large prime.
Thus by a theorem of S. Lang and A. Weil [13], if the prime modulus p
is sufficiently large the number of solutions N(f, p) of the equation f ≡ 0
(mod p) satisfies the inequality
(4.6)
∣∣N(f, p)− pm−1∣∣ < C(f)pm−1− 12 ,
where the constant C(f) depends only on the coefficients of the absolutely
irreducible polynomial f . Further, in our case the constant C(f) does
not depend on the value of b. Indeed, since gcd(b, s) = 1 and gcd(n(n −
1)/2, ϕ(s)) = 1 for every 0 6= b ∈ Zs there exists a 0 6= a ∈ Zs such that
an(n−1)/2 ≡ b (mod s), and thus we have
Iα(X1, ..., Xm)− b ≡ Iα(X1, ..., Xm)− an(n−1)/2
≡an(n−1)/2
(
Iα
(
X1
a
, ...,
Xm
a
)
− 1
)
(mod s).
Thus the number of solutions of f ≡ 0 (mod s) is the same as the number
of solutions of Iα(Y1, ..., Ym) ≡ 1 (mod s) (as shown by the simple trans-
formation (X1, ..., Xm) = a(Y1, ..., Ym)), and the number of solutions of this
latter congruence clearly does not depend on b.
By (4.6) we have
(4.7) |N(α, b, p)− pm−1| < C1pm−1− 12
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and
(4.8) |N(α, b, q)− qm−1| < C1qm−1− 12 .
By the Chinese remainder theorem (see [4]) the number of solutions of
the equation f ≡ 0 (mod s) is N(α, b, s) = N(α, b, p)N(α, b, q). Thus, using
q/2 < p < q, we have
N(α, b, s) < (pq)m−1 + (pq)m−1
(
C1
p1/2
+
C1
q1/2
)
+ (pq)m−1
C21
(pq)1/2
<(pq)m−1 + (pq)m−1
C2
(pq)1/4
< sm−1 + C2sm−1−1/4.
The inequality
N(α, b, s) > sm−1 − C3sm−1−1/4
follows similarly.
Now suppose that gcd(b, s) 6= 1. If gcd(b, p) 6= 1 then Iα(X1, . . . , Xm) ≡ 0
(mod p), and since Iα factorises into linear factors, all solutions of this
congruence are contained in the union of at most n(n−1)/2 linear subspaces
of Zmp of dimension m − 1. Thus N(α, b, p) < n(n−1)2 pm−1. If gcd(b, p) = 1
then by (4.7) we have N(α, b, p) < C4p
m−1. Similar reasoning is true for
N(α, b, q). Thus we have
(4.9) N(α, b, s) < c2(α)s
m−1
for any b. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1

Proof of Theorem 3.2. Since we have Pcoll :=
N(α,b,s)
sm
Theorem 3.2 is a sim-
ple consequence of Theorem 3.1. 
5. Complexity of computing the value of an index form
Let K be again an algebraic number field of degree n ≥ 3 with discrimi-
nant DK and α a primitive integral element of K. Consider the index form
Iα(X) defined in (2.1). Since
DK/Q(l(X)) = (Iα(X))2DK ,
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in order to calculate the value of Iα(X) at a point x = (x2, . . . , xn), we only
have to compute the discriminant of the element
β := x2α + x3α
2 + · · ·+ xnαn−1,
divide it by DK and take square root of the result. Clearly, DK can be
computed as a pre-computation. Thus the complexity of computing the
value Iα(x) will be essentially the same as computing the discriminant of
the corresponding element β = l(x).
Let T be the ordinary hight of the minimal polynomial of α and A :=
max
2≤i≤n
{|xi|}.
Clearly, DK/Q(β) = D(Cβ(X)), where Cβ(X) is the characteristic poly-
nomial of β. Further, let Mβ be the matrix representation of β, i.e. the
matrix of the linear map which is defined by the multiplication by β in the
Q-vector space Q(α). Then Cβ(X) is the characteristic polynomial of the
matrix Mβ.
First we would like to estimate the time of computation of the matrix
Mβ. Using the Newton formulae (see Ch. 4.2.2 [4]) we can determine
the canonical representation of the values αn+i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. This
will take O(n2) operations (see the proof of Theorem 3 [1]). The entries
of the matrix Mβ will be bounded by B = AT
n. So for the computa-
tion of the characteristic polynomial of Mβ (using Algorithm 2.2.7 [4]) we
need n4 multiplications. Since the coefficients of Cβ(X) are bounded by
2n · nn ·Bn (see Proposition 2.2.10 [4]) we can use modular arithmetic with
the modulus M = 2n · nn · Bn and we get the time estimate O(n4 log2M)
for the calculation of Cβ(X). This means in fact that we are done in
O (n4(n log 2 + n log n+ n log(AT n))2) = O(n8 + n7 logA + n6 log2A) op-
erations.
Now we only have to calculate the discriminant of Cβ(X) using the sub-
resultant algorithm, which has complexity O(n4 log2(nN)) (see p. 119 [4]),
where N is the bound on the coefficients of Cβ(X) and C
′
β(X), i.e. N ≤ nM .
Thus the complexity will beO(n4 log2(n2M)) = O(n4 log2(2nnn+2AnT n
2
)) =
O(n4(n2 + n logA)2) = O(n8 + n7 logA + n6 log2A). This means that the
overall complexity of computing the value I(α) is also O(n8 + n7 logA +
n6 log2A).
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6. An application
In the previous sections we have investigated important properties of the
function Iα,s. Since pseudo-random functions can also be constructed using
the one-way function Iα,s in this section we will suggest the use of a hash
function based on such index forms.
The first question to be analyzed is how to choose α in order to guarantee
the security of our hash function. The methods developed for the solution
of ”arbitrary” index form equations at the recent moment make it possible
to solve index form equations where α has degree at most 6. For results
concerning the general cubic case see [9], for the quartic case [8] and for the
quintic case [7]. A long computation of about one month on a computer
with six parallel processors of 1GH under linux made possible for Bilu, Gaa´l
and Gyo˝ry to solve an index form equation over a sextic field with Galois
group S6 (see [3]). Further, there are algorithms for solving index form
equations also when α has degree ≥ 6 in the case when the field K := Q(α)
has proper subfields, or when the Galois group of K is cyclic. For a broad
survey of these kind of results and also for the description of the algorithms
which make possible to solve index form equations see the book of Gaa´l [6]
and the references given there.
The above facts show that we shall choose our α such that K := Q(α) is
a totally real primitive extension of Q of degree at least 7. Further, we have
to ensure that gcd(n(n−1)
2
, ϕ(s)) = 1, so we have to avoid the degrees 8, 9.
An α fulfilling all our requirements is for instance any root of the poly-
nomial
(6.10) x7 + x6 − 6x5 − 5x4 + 8x3 + 5x2 − 2x− 1.
(see [15]).
Now, concerning the choice of s = pq, with p, q primes we have to be aware
of the following. First of all s has to be about the size of 1024 bits, and it has
to resist any attempt to factorization, otherwise we cannot guarantee the
collision resistance of our hash function. Thus, choose the prime q of size
about 2512 and then the prime p such that q > p > q/2. This is certainly
possible by Tschebishev’s theorem. Moreover we have to be aware of the
condition gcd(n(n−1)
2
, ϕ(s)) = 1, i.e. gcd(21, ϕ(s)) = 1.
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Now we define our hash function in the following way. Let s be chosen
in the above way and let α be a root of the polynomial (6.10). Define
Iα,s(x1, . . . , x6) by (3.3). Since the largest prime divisor of the non-zero
discriminant the corresponding polynomial Iα(x1, x2, 0, . . . , 0) is less then
270, thus by the choice of p and q, the statements of Theorem 3.1 and 3.2
are true for Iα,s.
The value of our hash function on a binary string x = (x1, . . . , x6) of
bit-length 6 · 1024 (xi being of bit-length 1024) is defined by
h(x) := (Iα,s(x1, . . . , x6) mod pq) mod 1024.
If the bit-length of our binary string is not 6 · 1024 bit, then we complete x
to a binary string of length 6 ·k ·1024, where k is the least integer such that
6 · k · 1024 is larger then the length of x. This is done by copying so many
bits from the beginning of the string to the end of it that are needed to get
a binary string of bit-length 6 ·k ·1024. Then for each block of length 6 ·1024
we apply the function h, and then we consider the output as a new input
string. We continue this iteration until the output has bit-length 1024.
This function will keep collision free in all the steps of the iteration. Fur-
ther, we have experimentally investigated the avalanche effect of the above
hash function. We generated 100 random sequences of bits and changed 10
times consecutively one randomly chosen bit of each one. Then we counted
the number of changes of the bits of the output. The results can be sum-
marized as follows. The average of the number of the changed bits was
511.556. The least number of changed bits was 468, while the largest num-
ber of changed bits was 554. We have tested t he normality of the distribu-
tion of the above sample. We used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and we find
that the null hypothesis stating that the distribution of the sample can be
accepted at the significance level of 6,6
The above facts mean that the hash function suggested by us based on
index forms, which is proven to be collision resistant, is also promising from
the point of view of the avalanche effect. These properties guarantee its
security.
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